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THE REALITY PRINCIPLE
Lawrence G. Sager* and Nelson Tebbe**
INTRODUCTION
Many liberals have received the Supreme Court’s decision in
Masterpiece Cakeshop. Ltd. v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission1
as narrow and regrettable.2 On this view, Justice Anthony M.
Kennedy sought to escape a conflict between two of his
paramount commitments, to religious freedom and to equal
citizenship for LGBTQ people, by writing a majority opinion that
was specific to the peculiar facts in Colorado and therefore limited
in its precedential effect. But this reading overlooks aspects of the
Court’s ruling that may well be consequential. Some of these are
salutary, while others are more troubling.
On the one hand, Masterpiece established several broad
principles that can work to promote full and equal citizenship for
all Americans in future cases. Now is the moment to underscore
these aspects of the decision, because additional cases pitting
religious freedom against equality law are percolating in lower
courts. In fact, Masterpiece Cakeshop itself is already back in
litigation after it turned away a customer who requested a cake to
celebrate a gender transition.3 Before long, a Court without
* Alice Jane Drysdale Sheffield Regents Chair, University of Texas School of Law.
** Professor of Law, Cornell Law School; Laurance S. Rockefeller Visiting Faculty
Fellow, University Center for Human Values, Princeton University. Warm thanks for
comments on previous drafts to Dale Carpenter, Leslie Kendrick, Christopher Lund,
Melissa Murray, Douglas NeJaime, Richard Schragger, and Micah Schwartzman. The
authors joined an amicus brief in the principal case discussed here. Brief of Church-State
Scholars as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents, Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v.
Colorado Civil Rights Commission, __ U.S. __, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018) (No. 16-111), 2017
WL 6988022.
1. __ U.S. __, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018).
2. See, e.g., David Cole, This Takes the Cake, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, July 19, 2018, at 24
(describing the case as decided on a “case-specific ground” and arguing that the Court’s
finding of antireligious bias was “strained, to put it mildly”).
3. See infra note 59 (discussing Verified Complaint, Masterpiece Cakeshop, Inc. v.
Elenis, No. 1:18-cv-02074 (D. Colo. filed Aug. 14, 2018)); see also, e.g., Arlene’s Flowers,
Inc. v. Washington, __ U.S. __, 138 S. Ct. 2671 (2018) (granting cert., vacating the judgment,
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Justice Kennedy will face such critical questions again, and under
social circumstances that will be equally or even more intense. By
the time it does, the salutary lessons of Masterpiece must have
been learned.
On the other hand, there is an interpretation of the majority
opinion that should be strenuously resisted. Several passages of
Justice Kennedy’s opinion could be read to suggest that the basic
structure of Colorado’s civil rights law, as enforced by state
officials and judges, was unconstitutionally hostile to religion.
That proposition is both wrong and dangerous, but it is already
being promoted by scholars and activists in the aftermath of the
decision, including in the new Masterpiece litigation.4
In this Article, we address both the promising and the
problematic aspects of the opinion. In Part I, we identify three
constitutional principles that were established or reaffirmed in
Masterpiece: that there is no constitutional right to religious
exemptions from neutral and generally applicable public
accommodations laws; that the government’s interest in avoiding
dignitary harm is sufficient to defeat most claims for religious
exemptions; and that courts should be sensitive to evidence of
government animus against vulnerable groups. In the course of
that analysis, we emphasize the Court’s recognition that for these
purposes sexual orientation discrimination and racial
discrimination are structurally parallel.
In Part II, we turn to the mistaken interpretation of the
Court’s opinion that worries us. At points, Kennedy’s language
has been read to suggest that Colorado’s civil rights practices
violate the state’s obligation of neutrality toward religion.
Colorado’s law protects gay couples and religious believers alike
from discrimination in the marketplace, of course. And the state
allows any baker—including religious objectors to gay marriage—
to refuse to write messages with which they disagree on their
cakes, including messages that affirm marriage equality. Yet some
are arguing that these commonplace civil rights practices are
somehow biased against religion. If Justice Kennedy really did
mean to imply that Colorado’s administration of
and remanding for further consideration in light of Masterpiece); Brush & Nib Studio, LC
v. City of Phoenix, 418 P.3d. 426 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2018) (ruling against a wedding vendor
who had religious objections to serving a same-sex couple).
4. See infra text accompanying notes 41–46 (citing scholars); see also infra note 59
(describing the recent Masterpiece complaint).
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antidiscrimination law contains a constitutional flaw, then he was
deeply mistaken, and mistaken in a way that poses serious danger
for the protection of equal rights in the United States. We explain
why, drawing on an analysis provided by Charles Black during the
civil rights era.5
Black thought that critics of Brown v. Board of Education6
had ignored the unduckable social import of racial segregation.
Applying a “reality principle,” Black made legally relevant the
social fact that segregation worked to perpetuate white
supremacy. We argue that similar attention to the social structure
of antidiscrimination laws excludes the errant interpretation of
Masterpiece.
Colorado’s
enforcement
of
its
public
accommodations law rightly protected groups that were subject to
structural injustice, including both religious denominations
themselves and the LGBTQ community, and its actions should
not signal any hostility toward religion.
Today, many religious conservatives feel beleaguered—they
see themselves as the subjects of an overweening and
overconfident liberal orthodoxy that seeks to stamp out their way
of life. They contend that liberalism has become illiberal; that it
enforces a cruel and ironic form of conformity. We deeply respect
the sincerity and importance of religious convictions to many.
Moreover, we understand that some religious faiths have been
subject to systematic discrimination. Not only our scholarship, but
our personal experience testifies to that truth.
Civil rights law in Colorado—and in every other jurisdiction
of which we are aware—protects religious believers against
discrimination based on their beliefs. What it does not do is give
religiously-motivated persons a blanket exemption from public
accomodations laws to which they object. The central aim of civil
rights law is to protect members of vulnerable groups from the
harms of structural injustice; that vital project would be
undermined by a broad carve out for religious dissent.
Antidiscrimination law does not take sides in a purported culture
war, nor does it violate the liberal and democratic commitment to
government neutrality among comprehensive conceptions. To the
contrary, it stipulates what citizens who are divided on questions
5. Charles L. Black, Jr., The Lawfulness of the Segregation Decisions, 69 YALE L.J.
421 (1960).
6. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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of profound importance nonetheless owe to each other in order
to live together as equals in our political community.
I.
The Masterpiece Court embraced three broad themes that
provide guidance for the resolution of future conflicts between
religious freedom and antidiscrimination law, not only in pending
cases concerning wedding vendors but across constitutional
doctrine.
First, the Court reaffirmed that religious actors are not
constitutionally
entitled
to
exemptions
from
public
accommodations laws under normal circumstances. These laws,
which protect members of vulnerable groups against
discrimination by those who choose to provide goods and services
to the public, are too important to equal citizenship to allow for
exemptions based on conscience. Justice Kennedy’s majority
opinion treated this doctrine as constitutional bedrock: “it is a
general rule that [religious and philosophical] objections do not
allow business owners and other actors in the economy and in
society to deny protected persons equal access to goods and
services under a neutral and generally applicable public
accommodations law.”7
Including the votes of the two dissenters, who expressly
embraced this part the Court’s opinion,8 all nine justices thus
endorsed the application of the rule of Employment Division v.
Smith to typical public accommodations laws.9 This matters
because prominent scholars and lawyers had argued during the
litigation that the Court should abandon the rule of Smith at least
with respect to Colorado’s enforcement of its public
accommodations law and perhaps more generally.10 We will
7. Masterpiece Cakeshop Ltd. v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission, __ U.S. __, ,
138 S. Ct. 1719, 1727 (2018).
8. Id. at 1748 (Ginsburg, J., joined by Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
9. 494 U.S. 872 (1990). Writing separately, Justice Gorsuch later went on to
characterize Smith as “controversial in many Quarters.” Masterpiece, 138 S. Ct. at 1734
(Gorsuch, J., concurring).
10. Brief of Christian Legal Society, et al., as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners,
Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission, __ U.S. __, 138 S. Ct.
1719 (2018) (No. 16-111), 2017 WL 4005662, at *34 (“Colorado has protected the
consciences of one set of bakers, and refused to protect the consciences of another set of
bakers, who are squarely on opposite sides of the same divisive question. If the Court is
open to the possibility that such a law can be rationalized as neutral and generally
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address the neutrality of the Colorado law in Part II—for now, we
simply notice the Court’s reaffirmation of Smith in the context of
equality guarantees.
Note here that the Court declined the invitation of advocates
to distinguish between discrimination on the basis of sexual
orientation and discrimination on the basis of race. Conservatives
had been urging judges to find that religious exemptions from
laws protecting LGBTQ citizens were more acceptable than they
were from laws protecting racial minorities. As others have
explained more fully, the Court instead assimilated LGBTQ
rights to the model of racial equality and to the paradigm of full
and equal citizenship for everyone.11 Justice Kennedy
prominently cited Piggie Park, the leading precedent for the
proposition that a religious commitment to segregation cannot
justify a free exercise exemption from a public accommodations
law.12 That citation was important—it should permanently end the
argument that the structural injustice experienced by LGBTQ
customers is somehow less worthy of concern or more vulnerable
to dissent than racial subordination.
Second, Justice Kennedy recognized that the government’s
interest in avoiding dignitary harm is sufficient to support the
application of its antidiscrimination law, even without more
tangible economic harm. Whether avoiding stigmatic harm was
enough to justify application of the public accommodations law
was at issue because Charlie Craig and David Mullins were able
to find another wedding cake without significant economic loss.13
applicable, then Smith and [Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508
U.S. 520 (1993),] have failed as a means of protecting the free exercise of religion. In that
event, Smith’s holding that the Free Exercise Clause does not protect against neutral and
generally applicable laws should be reconsidered.”).
11. Douglas NeJaime & Reva Siegel, Religious Exemptions and Antidiscrimination
Law in Masterpiece Cakeshop, 128 YALE L.J. F. 201, 204 (2018) (“Conservative advocates
have long argued that courts and legislators should treat race and sexual orientation
differently, denying religious exemptions from race nondiscrimination mandates but
authorizing religious exemptions from sexual orientation nondiscrimination mandates . . .
. In Masterpiece Cakeshop, the Court rejects these arguments for expansive exemptions,
instead assimilating sexual orientation into the antidiscrimination framework and
affirming the importance of public accommodations laws.”).
12. Masterpiece, 138 S. Ct. at 1727 (citing Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, Inc.,
390 U.S. 400, 402 n.5 (1968) (calling “patently frivolous” the contention of a segregated
restaurant that the Civil Rights Act of 1964 “constitutes an interference with the free
exercise of the [owner’s] religion”) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
13. Robert Barnes, The spurned gay couple, the Colorado baker and the years spent
waiting for the Supreme Court, DENVER POST (Aug. 14, 2017, 11:50 AM),
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Yet Kennedy explained that invidious discrimination in the
marketplace imposes a more profound harm than increased
search costs. If equality laws were subject to unconstrained
exceptions on grounds of religion or morality, he said, the result
could be widespread refusals of service that would radiate
“community-wide stigma inconsistent with the history and
dynamics of civil rights laws.”14 Frequent religious and moral
exemptions to public accommodations laws would relegate
vulnerable groups to a subordinate social status.
Here too, advocates had been pushing the Court in the other
direction. Lawyers and scholars had long argued that “dignitary”
or “stigmatic” injury to same-sex couples should not count as
harm at all, or at least not a harm that was sufficiently serious to
override religious freedom.15 On this view, only feelings of selfworth could be at stake, and LGBTQ citizens should be
sufficiently resilient to resist such intangible injuries. Government
should not work to shield citizens from “mere offense.”
In Masterpiece, however, the Court rejected that view, holding
that the systematic subordination of groups is an alarming and
objective social wrong, not merely an injury to the feelings of the
affected group.
Finally, the majority overturned the lower court’s ruling for
the couple because the Court found evidence that state officials
had been infected by religious animus. Two members of the
Colorado Civil Rights Commission had made remarks that the
Court took as evidence of hostility toward those who oppose
marriage equality on religious grounds.16 Largely on the basis of

https://www.denverpost.com/2017/08/14/colorado-gay-wedding-cake-case/ (“‘We did
ultimately go to a different bakery,’ Mullins said.”).
14. Masterpiece, 138 S. Ct. at 1727.
15. Brief for Petitioners at 52, Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado Civil Rights
Commission, __ U.S. __, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018) (No. 16-111), 2017 WL 3913762 (“an
interest in avoiding some dignitary harms—though a real concern in certain
circumstances—cannot override Phillips’s First Amendment freedoms and his own equally
important dignitary interests”); Douglas Laycock, Religious Liberty for Politically Active
Minority Groups: A Response to NeJaime and Siegel, 125 YALE L.J. F. 369, 376 (2016)
(agreeing that “there is a dignitary harm in being refused service because of perceived
immorality” but arguing that “[p]reventing these harms cannot be a compelling interest
that justifies suppressing someone else’s individual rights”).
16. Masterpiece, 138 S. Ct. at 1729–30.
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those comments, the Court ruled for the baker, finding that he
had been the victim of antireligious “hostility.”17
It is questionable whether Colorado’s commissioners acted
out of hostility, as others have argued.18 Still, we are attracted to
the legal premise upon which the Court’s ruling rests. Justice
Kennedy drew on his opinion in Lukumi, where the Court struck
down a local ordinance because it was gerrymandered to target a
particular faith.19 The parts of Justice Kennedy’s Lukumi opinion
that concerned legislative history failed to draw a majority.20
Kennedy nevertheless succeeded in attracting a majority for that
approach in Masterpiece, perhaps because of his argument that
the dispute there concerned an adjudicative body, which carries a
heavier burden of impartiality.21
Setting aside the question of whether the distinction between
adjudicative and legislative bias can be defended, Kennedy’s
approach may be attractive. His earlier opinion in Lukumi rightly
invoked Arlington Heights, an equal protection decision
concerning racial discrimination.22 Under that approach, a
plaintiff first must show that impermissible discrimination was “a
motivating factor” by pointing to multiple circumstances. Then
the government has an opportunity to show that it would have
taken the same action even absent that bias.23 In Masterpiece,
Justice Kennedy added force to this approach by ignoring the
requirement of “but-for” causation. For Kennedy, a presumption
of unconstitutionality attaches to any government action that is
17. Id. at 1730. For a trenchant analysis of the Court’s deployment of animus
doctrine, see Melissa Murray, The New Minorities, 2019 SUP. CT. REV. (forthcoming).
18. Leslie Kendrick & Micah Schwartzman, The Etiquette of Animus, 132 HARV. L.
REV. 133, 138–43 (2018).
19. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 534 (1993).
20. Id. at 540–42 (plurality opinion); see also id. at 558 (Scalia, J., concurring in part
and concurring in the judgment).
21. Masterpiece, 138 S. Ct. at 1730 (“Members of the [Lukumi] Court . . . disagreed
on the question whether statements made by lawmakers may properly be taken into
account in determining whether a law intentionally discriminates on the basis of religion.
In this case, however, the remarks were made in a very different context—by an
adjudicatory body deciding a particular case.”) (citation omitted).
22. Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 540 (plurality opinion) (citing Vill. of Arlington Heights v.
Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266–68 (1977) (setting out factors to be
considered when determining a government purpose)).
23. Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 270 n.21 (“Proof that the decision by the Village
was motivated in part by a racially discriminatory purpose would not necessarily have
required invalidation of the challenged decision. Such proof would, however, have shifted
to the Village the burden of establishing that the same decision would have resulted even
had the impermissible purpose not been considered.”).
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motivated by hostility toward a group that is vulnerable to
subordination, even if that animus is mixed with legitimate
motivations. The government still has an opportunity to rebut, but
it must do more than demonstrate that it would have taken the
same action even absent its bias. Instead, it must make the more
difficult showing that its action is narrowly tailored to a
compelling state interest.24 That sensitivity to government
hostility is probably a good thing—it suggests that close scrutiny
should be applied to any government action that is motivated,
even in part, by bias toward a group subject to structural injustice.
Thus, the outcome in Masterpiece depended upon the
proposition that the Constitution presumptively protects against
any government decisionmaking that is causally influenced by
hostility to religious dissenters, even if that hostility is not
essential to the official action being challenged, an approach that
was endorsed by the seven Justices in the majority and almost
certainly congenial to Justices Ginsburg and Sotomayor in
dissent. Now the Court should extend that approach beyond
religious cases, and make discriminatory motivation against
subordinate groups presumptively unconstitutional.
II.
So Masterpiece promises several advances in the law
governing conflicts between religious freedom and equality
guarantees, not only for LGBTQ citizens, and not only in the law
governing conflicts between religious freedom and equality
guarantees, but in the broad constitutional project of protecting
those vulnerable to structural injustice. However, the Court’s
decision contains another element that may prove equally
consequential but more deleterious to the guarantee of equal
citizenship. In the course of his opinion, Justice Kennedy could be
read to have suggested that the basic structure of civil rights law,
as applied by Colorado officials, evinced hostility toward religion.
24. As others have noted, Justice Kennedy did not give the government an
opportunity to show that its actions were necessary for the pursuit of a compelling interest.
See Stephanie Barclay, The Supreme Court’s Cakeshop Ruling Is Not Narrow—And That’s
A Good Thing, THE HILL (June 6, 2018, 2:00 PM), https://thehill.com/opinion/judiciary/
391004-supreme-courts-cakeshop-ruling-is-not-narrow-and-thats-a-good-thing
(“[T]he
government doesn’t even get a chance to argue that it had a sufficient justification for that
type of religious discrimination. It is per se unconstitutional.”). Justice Kennedy’s failure
to apply the compelling interest test was a mistake. See Kendrick & Schwartzman, supra
note 18, at 152–53.
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Whether Justice Kennedy intended to invite that conclusion or
not, it has already been picked up and elaborated by academics
and advocates, as we will explain.25
To frame our discussion, it is necessary to clear away aspects
of the decision that do not trouble us here. Recall first that the
Masterpiece Court ruled for Jack Phillips, the baker, and against
Charlie Craig and David Mullins, the couple celebrating their
wedding, on the ground that state administrative officials made
statements that displayed hostility toward religion.26 Although
that reasoning was flawed,27 it was specific to the facts of
Masterpiece and can be set aside.
Justice Kennedy’s opinion for the majority also criticized the
way Colorado civil rights officials had turned away cases brought
by someone named William Jack.28 In three separate situations,
William Jack asked bakers to produce cakes that bore messages
condemning marriage equality while referencing Christian
scripture. When the bakers refused, William Jack sued them for
discrimination on the basis of religion in violation of Colorado’s
public accommodations law. Colorado civil rights officials turned
away William Jack’s challenges, reasoning that he had been
rejected not because he was religious, but because the bakers
disagreed with his messages.29 Nothing in the state’s civil rights
25. See infra text accompanying notes 41–46, 53–56.
26. Masterpiece, 138 S. Ct. at 1730 (reviewing statements by the commissioners and
holding that “the Court cannot avoid the conclusion that these statements [by the two
commissioners] cast doubt on the fairness and impartiality of the Commission’s
adjudication of Phillips’ case”); id. at 1732 (concluding that the while the Commission
could have weighed the state’s interest against Phillips’ without violating neutrality, the
“official expressions of hostility to religion in some of the commissioners’ comments . . .
were inconsistent with what the Free Exercise Clause requires” and its “disparate
consideration of Phillips’ case compared to the cases of the other bakers suggests the
same”).
27. For persuasive critiques, see Kendrick & Schwartzman, supra note 18, at 138–45;
Michael Dorf, Masterpiece Cakeshop Ruling Should (But Probably Won’t) Doom the
ON
LAW
(June
4,
2018,
11:33
AM),
Travel
Ban,
DORF
http://www.dorfonlaw.org/2018/06/masterpiece-cakeshop-ruling-should-but.html; Robert
W. Tuttle & Ira C. Lupu, Masterpiece Cakeshop–A Troublesome Application Of Free
Exercise Principles By A Court Determined To Avoid Hard Questions, TAKE CARE (June
7, 2018), https://takecareblog.com/blog/masterpiece-cakeshop-a-troublesome-applicationof-free-exercise-principles-by-a-court-determined-to-avoid-hard-questions.
28. Will C. Holden, Castle Rock Man Whose “Anti-Gay” Cake Was Rejected: “I Was
(Jan.
20,
2015,
5:23
PM),
Discriminated
Against,”
FOX31 DENVER
https://kdvr.com/2015/01/20/man-who-requested-anti-gay-cake-from-denver-baker-iscastle-rock-educator/.
29. Jack v. Azucar Bakery, Charge No. P20140069X (Colo. Civil Rights Div. Mar. 25,
2015), available at http://perma.cc/5K6D-VV8U; Jack v. Le Bakery Sensual, Inc., Charge

5 - SAGER & TEBBE.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

180

CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY

2/20/19 8:32 PM

[Vol. 34:171

law prohibited that, according to Colorado officials, and nothing
about it suggested religious discrimination.30
Writing for the Court, Justice Kennedy nevertheless held
that Colorado’s treatment of the bakery cases reflected hostility
to religion. Here too, he highlighted express statements. For
instance, the Colorado appellate court wrote in a footnote that
civil rights officials had “found that the bakeries did not refuse
[William Jack’s] request because of his creed, but rather because
of the offensive nature of the requested message.”31 Kennedy
found fault with this characterization, saying that the state court
had improperly judged William Jack’s cakes to be “offensive.”32
We think that Kennedy’s reading of the footnote was mistaken
because the Colorado court was referring to the private bakers’
perception of William Jack’s messages as offensive, not that of the
state.33 On this account, the worst that can be said of the state court
is that its use of language was careless. But this aspect of the
holding of the Masterpiece Court, like its concern with statements
made by Colorado administrators, is case-specific and benign in
its guidance.
There was a more worrisome aspect of Justice Kennedy’s
treatment of the William Jack cases, however. Kennedy saw
Colorado’s divergent treatment of Williams Jack’s requests as
reflecting hostility to religion, independent of the state court’s use
of language. Kennedy identified two missteps by Colorado
officials. First, state civil rights authorities concluded that any
message conveyed by the wedding cake in Masterpiece would be
attributed to Craig and Mullins, not the baker. But they did not
consider whether William Jack’s messages would in like fashion
be attributed to him rather than the bakers who declined to
inscribe their cakes with them.34 A second misstep, for Kennedy,
concerned the bakers’ willingness to serve other products to the
No. P20140070X (Colo. Civil Rights Div. Mar. 24, 2015), available at
http://perma.cc/35BW–9C2N; Jack v. Gateaux, Ltd., Charge No. P20140071X (Colo. Civil
Rights Div. Mar. 24, 2015), available at http://perma.cc/JN4U-NE6V.
30. Craig v. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Inc., CR 2013-0008 (Colo. Civ. Rights. Com’n.
Dec. 6, 2013), available at https://www.aclu.org/legal-document/craig-and-mullins-vmasterpiece-cakeshop-decision.
31. Mullins v. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Inc., 370 P.3d 272, 282 n.8 (Colo. App. 2015).
32. Masterpiece, 138 S. Ct. at 1731 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
33. See Tuttle & Lupu, supra note 27 (criticizing the majority’s analysis of footnote
eight); Kendrick & Schwartzman, supra note 18, at 144–45 (same).
34. Masterpiece Cakeshop Ltd. v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission, __ U.S. __, ,
138 S. Ct. 1719, 1730 (2018).
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same customers. Colorado officials thought it relevant that the
bakers who declined to sell William Jack his inscribed cakes
would have sold him other cakes, including cakes bearing
different religious messages; but they did not think it a matter of
consequence that Phillips would have been willing to sell other
goods to LGBTQ customers.35 For Justice Kennedy and the
Court, these two analytic disparities suggested hostility to
religion.36
Justice Kennedy’s criticisms flowed from an oddly finegrained and unsympathetic reading of the behavior of Colorado’s
officials. We are tempted to see them as make-weights, designed
to allow Kennedy to avoid the ultimate force of Colorado’s
commitment to equal citizenship by finding fault with its handling
of these particular litigations. Whether that diagnosis is right or
wrong, similar missteps can be avoided in future cases in Colorado
and elsewhere. Officials can simply be more careful to justify their
different treatment of different cases.
So up to this point, the elements of state conduct upon which
the Masterpiece Court relied were fact-specific, avoidable, and
therefore harmless, except for these litigants. But Justice
Kennedy’s opinion for the Court may be read as objecting to a
different aspect of Colorado’s conduct that could not be as easily
avoided. On this reading, the state was constitutionally entitled to
protect gay and lesbian couples from wedding cake refusals only
if it also protected customers who requested cakes inscribed with
messages supporting traditional marriage.
That would be both a misreading of the Court’s opinion and
a constitutional mistake. But some language in Justice Kennedy’s
opinion could be read to require the uniform treatment of these
two sorts of cases.. At various points, he wrote:
Another indication of hostility is the difference in treatment
between Phillips’ case and the cases of other bakers who
objected to a requested cake on the basis of conscience and
prevailed before the Commission.37

35. Id.
36. Id. at 1732 (concluding that “[t]he Commission’s disparate consideration of
Phillips’ case compared to the cases of the other bakers suggests [hostility to religion]”).
37. Id. at 1730.
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[T]he Commission’s consideration of Phillips’ religious
objection did not accord with its treatment of these other
objections.38
The Commission’s disparate consideration of Phillips’ case
compared to the cases of the other bakers suggests [hostility to
religion].39

In context, it is clear that what Kennedy meant by “difference
in treatment” was not the bottom line fact that the outcomes were
different, but rather the divergence in how they were justified. He
had in mind the two missteps we report above. We are confident
of that reading, and reasonably confident that the opinion will
come to be widely understood that way, especially since elsewhere
Kennedy was at pains to say that Colorado could have offered
reasons to justify divergent results in these cases.40
Nevertheless, Kennedy stopped short of saying that those
alternative rationales would be constitutionally sufficient. His
omission will lead some to argue that state and local governments
are constitutionally barred from treating the cases differently in
any respect. That proposition is surely wrong, and it threatens civil
rights enforcement. Though perhaps remote, the risk that it could
be authoritatively attributed to the majority in Masterpiece is the
most troubling aspect of the opinion. Interpretations by others
have done little to reassure us.
For instance, Justice Kagan, joined by Justice Breyer, wrote
separately to insist that divergent treatment of the two bakery
scenarios was justifiable. She and Breyer signed the majority
opinion because they believed that Colorado had committed one
or both of Kennedy’s missteps.41 (We side with the dissenters on
this point.) But Justice Kagan went on to articulate a rationale
that Colorado officials could have used to distinguish the cases:
They might have simply relied on the fact that the bakers who
38. Id.
39. Id. at 1732.
40. At one point, Justice Kennedy clarified “that the State’s interest could have been
weighed against Phillips’ sincere religious objections in a way consistent with the requisite
religious neutrality.” Id. at 1732. And at another, he allowed that “[t]here were, to be sure,
responses to these arguments [regarding the comparison to the William Jack cases] that
the State could make when it contended for a different result in seeking the enforcement
of its generally applicable state regulations of businesses that serve the public.” Id. at 1728.
41. Id. at 1732 (Kagan, J., concurring) (“The Court finds that the legal reasoning of
the state agencies differed in significant ways as between the Jack cases and the Phillips
case.”).
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refused to provide William Jack’s cakes would have refused to
create those cakes for any customer. Phillips, by contrast, refused
to produce a wedding cake for Craig and Mullins that he happily
would have baked for an opposite-sex couple.42 Justice Kagan’s
distinction was deft, but without more it could be dismissed as
facile.
That seems to be the reaction of Douglas Laycock and
Thomas Berg, prominent scholars of religious freedom.43 They
concede that if Phillips did in fact refuse to sell the same sort of
cake that he regularly made for opposite-sex couples—as he
certainly did, according to the majority’s facts44—then “Kagan’s
rationalization holds.”45 But, they say, “it is still a rationalization.
Everyone would still know what is really going on: The
commission agrees with the protected bakers and disagrees with
Jack Phillips.”46
It is this blunt insistence that hostility to religion would
inevitably be signaled by a loss for the Masterpiece baker, despite
a win for the other bakers, that puts us in mind of Charles Black’s
seminal defense of Brown v. Board of Education. Against those
who argued that the Court had taken sides in a policy debate
among Americans without any basis in principle or law, Black
made an “awkwardly simple” point: Segregation works to
subordinate African-Americans, and racial subordination is
prohibited by the Equal Protection Clause.47 Relying on history
and contemporary culture, he observed that the “social meaning”
of segregation renders racial minorities unequal.48 Or again, “the
social meaning of segregation is the putting of the Negro in a
position of walled-off inferiority.”49 Though we are not the first to

42. Id. at 1733.
43. Douglas Laycock & Thomas Berg, Masterpiece Cakeshop—Not as Narrow as
May First Appear, SCOTUSBLOG (June 5, 2018, 3:48 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/
2018/06/symposium-masterpiece-cakeshop-not-as-narrow-as-may-first-appear/.
44. Justice Kennedy reported that Craig and Mullins, accompanied by Craig’s
mother, entered Masterpiece Cakeshop and requested a wedding cake. Before they could
describe the type of cake they wanted, they were told by Phillips that he did not make
wedding cakes for same-sex couples. “The couple left the shop without further discussion.”
Masterpiece, 138 S. Ct. at 1724. In other words, Phillips refused to make them any kind of
wedding cake.
45. Laycock & Berg, supra note 43.
46. Id.
47. Black, supra note 5, at 421.
48. Id. at 424.
49. Id. at 427.
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appreciate the relevance of Black’s work for contemporary
conflicts,50 we rely on him in a somewhat distinct way,
emphasizing his methodological argument for a “reality
principle” that allows and even requires courts to notice the social
significance of government actions.51
This is not a situation where “we ought to exercise one of the
sovereign prerogatives of philosophers—that of laughter,” as
Charles Black urged.52 But with regard to “what is really going
on,” Laycock and Berg have things backward.53 The logic of
Colorado’s divergent treatment of the Jack Phillips and William
Jack cases is simple, and it is innocent of any disagreement with
or aversion to religion. Colorado—like many states—protects
religious communities alongside other groups that are subject to
structural injustice, including racial minorities, women, ethnic
groups, and LGBTQ citizens.54 For a variety of reasons, Colorado
does not protect persons who seek to broadcast controversial
messages from being refused because of the specific content of
those messages.55 If Jack Phillips—or any other baker—had
declined to prepare a cake inscribed with words endorsing same
sex marriage because of the content of the message alone, he
would have violated no rule.56 So Colorado’s law is evenhanded
50. See, e.g., James M. Oleske, Jr., “State Action,” Equal Protection, and Religious
Resistance to LGBT Rights, 87 U. COLO. L. REV. 1, 1 (2016) (citing as the model for the
Article’s title Charles L. Black, Jr., Foreword: “State Action,” Equal Protection, and
California’s Proposition 14, 81 HARV. L. REV. 69 (1967)); Toni M. Massaro, The
Lawfulness of the Same-Sex Marriage Decisions: Charles Black on Obergefell, 25 WM. &
MARY BILL OF RTS. J. 321 (2016).
51. Charles L. Black, Jr., Foreword: “State Action,” Equal Protection, and
California’s Proposition 14, 81 HARV. L. REV. 69, 90 (1967).
52. Black, supra note 5, at 424.
53. Laycock & Berg, supra note 43.
54. See State Public Accommodations Laws, National Conference of State
Legislatures (July 13, 2016), http://www.ncsl.org/research/civil-and-criminal-justice/statepublic-accommodation-laws.aspx (surveying the groups covered by state public
accommodations laws).
55. See, e.g., Jack v. Azucar Bakery, Charge No. P20140069X (Colo. Civil Rights Div.
Mar. 25, 2015), http://perma.cc/5K6D-VV8U.
56. The Supreme Court of the United Kingdom recently came to a similar conclusion
in Lee v. Ashers Baking Co., Ltd., [2018] UKSC 49. There, Mr. Lee requested a cake
displaying an image of Bert and Ernie, the logo of QueerSpace, “an organization of the
LGBT community” to which Mr. Lee belonged, and the words “Support Gay Marriage.”
Ashers Baking Company refused to create the cake on religious grounds. Id. at paras. 10,
12. The court ruled for the bakery on the ground that the company refused to provide the
cake because of opposition to its message, not because of Mr. Lee’s identity, id. at para.
22, and therefore it did not violate the Equality Act of 2006. The court rejected the
argument that the sentiment “Support Gay Marriage” was so closely associated with
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and symmetrical in its protection of religious believers and
LGBTQ citizens against discrimination by merchants who decline
to provide their goods or services to them on an equal and
dignified basis, and Colorado’s law is evenhanded and
symmetrical in permitting merchants to decline to inscribe their
goods with messages with which they disagree, whether those
messages are in favor or in opposition to marriage equality or any
other subject matter.
So what aspect of Colorado’s attempt to safeguard same-sex
couples against discrimination could be understood to reflect bias
against religion? One possibility was provided by the concurring
opinion of Justices Gorsuch and Alito. They argued that Colorado
unfairly treated Phillips’ refusal to provide a wedding cake to a
same-sex couple as “tantamount” to exclusion on the basis of
sexual orientation,57 on the one hand, while failing to treat refusals
to produce William Jack’s cakes as tantamount to discrimination
on the basis of religion, on the other.58 According to Gorsuch and
Alito, that inconsistency violated the Constitution. “[J]ust as
cakes celebrating same-sex weddings are (usually) requested by
persons of a particular sexual orientation,” Justice Gorsuch wrote,
“so too are cakes expressing religious opposition to same-sex
weddings (usually) requested by persons of particular religious
faiths.”59 Here we put to one side the matter of whether the
LGBTQ status that rejecting it amounted to discrimination on the basis of sexual
orientation. It noted that many people who are not LGBTQ support same-sex marriage.
Id. at para. 25. As others have perceptively noted, it also matters that Mr. Lee was not
requesting a wedding cake—he was planning to take the cake to a meeting of the
QueerSpace organization. Dale Carpenter, U.K. Supreme Court: Baker Doesn’t Have to
Place Pro-Gay Marriage Message on Cake, THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Oct. 11, 2018, 5:30
PM), https://reason.com/volokh/2018/10/11/uk-supreme-court-baker-doesnt-have-to-pl.
(“On this view, Jack Phillips’ refusal to bake any cake at all for a gay wedding
in Masterpiece Cakeshop is sexual orientation discrimination because it is closely linked to
the sexual orientation of his customers. But the [owners’] refusal to ice the words ‘Support
Gay Marriage’ in Lee is not sexual orientation discrimination because it is not much of a
proxy for the sexual orientation of their customers.”). In other words, refusing to create
any wedding cake for a marriage celebration between two men is closely associated with
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation in a manner that refusing to create a
message supporting marriage equality is not.
57. Mullins v. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Inc., 370 P.3d 272, 282 n.8 (Colo. App. 2015)
(“Masterpiece admits that its decision to refuse Craig’s and Mullins’ requested wedding
cake was because of its opposition to same-sex marriage which, based on Supreme Court
precedent, we conclude is tantamount to discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation”)
(citations omitted).
58. Masterpiece, 138 S. Ct. 1719, at 1736–37 (Gorsuch, J., concurring).
59. Id. (“Either actual proof of intent to discriminate on the basis of membership in
a protected class is required (as the Commission held in Mr. Jack’s case), or it is sufficient
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history of cakes expressing opposition to marriage equality is long
enough to characterize one way or another, taking the point at
face value.
At places in the concurrence, it seemed as if Gorsuch and
Alito were drawn to the view that Phillips did not discriminate
against gays and lesbians—he merely refused to be associated
with same-sex weddings.60 But it would seem well within the
prerogative of Colorado to determine whether excluding cakes
for same-sex weddings counts as discrimination on the basis of
sexual orientation for purposes of state law. On the best
to ‘presume’ such intent from the knowing failure to serve someone in a protected class
(as the Commission held in Mr. Phillips’s case). Perhaps the Commission could have
chosen either course as an initial matter.”).
In the second round of litigation against Masterpiece, now pending in federal
district court, the bakery makes something close to Gorsuch’s argument—illustrating its
potential influence. There, Phillips turned away August Scardina, a transgender customer
who requested a cake that was pink on the inside and blue on the outside in order to
celebrate Scardina’s gender transition. Verified Complaint at paras. 6–7, 177–79,
Masterpiece Cakeshop, Inc. v. Elenis, No. 1:18-cv-02074, 2018 WL 3870105 (D. Colo. Aug.
14, 2018). After Colorado officials found probable cause that Phillips had discriminated on
the basis of gender identity in violation of state public accommodations law, Phillips and
the bakery sued them in federal court. In the Complaint, the Alliance Defending Freedom
(ADF), which is continuing to represent Masterpiece and Phillips, details the facts of the
William Jack cases. Id. at paras. 69–74. Next, ADF argues that Colorado violated the
Constitution in the first Masterpiece litigation by treating Phillips’ objection to baking
Craig and Mullins’s cake “worse” than it treated the other bakers’ objections to the
William Jack cases. Id. at para. 167. Specifically, and echoing Gorsuch without citing him,
ADF contends that Colorado “presum[ed]” that Phillips’ refusal constituted
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation, while not “presuming” that the bakers
who rejected William Jack’s cakes were discriminating on the basis of his faith. Id. at paras.
212–13. And ADF invokes the Supreme Court’s decision in Masterpiece to support a rule
against that kind of “unequal enforcement policy.” Id. at paras. 217-18. Finally, ADF
concludes that Colorado is continuing to violate the Constitution by equating Phillips’
rejection of Scardina’s cake with discrimination on the basis of gender identity, even
though it made no such “presum[ption]” in the William Jack cases, id. at paras. 212–21,
and the Complaint seems to suggest that treating those cases differently is “blatantly and
brazenly hostile toward religion,” id. at para. 285. This is not ADF’s only argument, but it
is central to the litigation.
60. See, e.g., Masterpiece, 138 S. Ct. at 1737. For an explicit argument that
discrimination on the basis of same-sex marriage does not necessarily amount to
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation, see Brief of Amici Curiae Legal Scholars
in Support of Equality and Religious and Expressive Freedom in Support of Appellants,
Washington v. Arlene’s Flowers, Inc., No. 91615-2, 2016 WL 6126873, at *20 (Wash. Sept.
30, 2016) (“[i]n erroneously conflating Mrs. Stutzman’s religious objection to
celebrating same-sex marriage with a refusal to serve customers ‘because of’ their sexual
orientation, the Superior Court extended Washington’s antidiscrimination law beyond
its natural scope and meaning”). For an argument that sexual orientation identity is
connected in complex ways to interpersonal relationships, including marriage, see Douglas
NeJaime, Marriage Inequality: Same-Sex Relationships, Religious Exemptions, and the
Production of Sexual Orientation Discrimination, 100 CAL. L. REV. 1169, 1197–99 (2012).
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understanding, Gorsuch and Alito were arguing that Colorado
was constitutionally required to treat William Jack as the victim
of discrimination on the basis of religion if and because it treated
Charlie Craig and David Mullins as victims of discrimination on
the basis of sexual orientation.
In an ominous sign, Justices Gorsuch and Alito thought that
view was consistent with Kennedy’s majority opinion, which they
also signed. This is part of what makes us concerned that
Kennedy’s opinion could be misread in the radical and misshapen
way we are exploring. Perhaps Justices Gorsuch and Alito
thought their argument resonated with the second misstep that
Kennedy identified, namely that Colorado thought it relevant that
the bakers would have refused to create William Jack’s cakes for
any customers, but irrelevant that Phillips would have sold other
products to Craig and Mullins.61
In any event, Justices Gorsuch and Alito’s claim here is
implausible—it flies in the face of the reality principle. To
understand why, we need to realize that differences in treatment
are occurring at two levels. At the first level, there are decisions
by bakers to prepare wedding cakes under some circumstances
and not others. Whether the bakers’ decisions are discriminatory
is up to the state; it is a matter of Colorado law. At the second
level, there is a state’s choice to outlaw some cake refusals while
permitting others. Whether the state’s determinations are
discriminatory is the question of federal constitutional law that
the Court confronted. Yet we can only judge the appropriateness
of the state’s selective behavior at the second level by
understanding important features of the bakers’ selective refusals
at the first level.
Let us begin by considering the refusal of a baker to provide
a cake for a gay wedding because he opposes same sex marriage.
Gays and lesbians have long been the victims of structural
injustice—or patterns of “disrespect and subordinat[ion],” to use
Justice Kennedy’s language in Obergefell—that are enduring,
pervasive, and tentacular.62 Legal, cultural, and religious bans on
same sex marriage did not emerge as isolated judgments or
discrete religious truths about marriage. Instead, they were
integrated strands in a web of legally-endorsed social beliefs and
61.
62.

See Masterpiece, 138 S. Ct.. at 1730.
Obergefell v. Hodges, __ U.S. __, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2604 (2015).
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practices in which LGBTQ conduct and identity were deplored
and denounced. For gays and lesbians, that world of unequal
regard is fresh and tenacious; it has not been swept away by a
handful of court decisions.
Same sex marriage is a site where structural injustice lingers.
Marriage is for many the natural apotheosis of personal intimacy
and union. In the lives of gays and lesbians—and only in their
lives, with the rarest exceptions63—marriage is a union between
two men or two women. The Supreme Court’s recognition of a
constitutional principle of marriage equality carries with it a
profound social commitment to inclusion, to the repudiation of
structural injustice. This was not left to our imaginations—the
Obergefell Court made explicit the connection between marriage
exclusion and “subordinat[ion]” of LGBTQ citizens:
Especially against a long history of disapproval of their
relationships, this denial to same-sex couples of the right to
marry works a grave and continuing harm. The imposition of
this disability on gays and lesbians serves to disrespect and
subordinate them.64

Refusals by vendors in the wedding industry to provision
same sex weddings operate in the shadow of the history of
structural injustice that the Court has so conspicuously set itself
against. Necessarily, such refusals serve to exacerbate unequal
citizenship. Courts have seen this, and they have repeatedly
concluded that discrimination against people who wish to marry
someone of the same sex constitutes discrimination on the basis of
sexual orientation.65 The Supreme Court was not breaking new
63. See Jim Oleske, Justice Gorsuch, Kippahs, and False Analogies in Masterpiece
Cakeshop, TAKE CARE (June 9, 2018), https://takecareblog.com/blog/justice-gorsuchkippahs-and-false-analogies-in-masterpiece-cakeshop (“The Court has also taught that
same-sex relations are inextricably tied to gay and lesbian people, and has thus ‘declined
to distinguish between status and conduct’ in that context . . . . [T]he inherent connection
between same-sex marriage and sexual-orientation is no less true just because there may
be isolated incidents of straight people entering same-sex marriages.”).
64. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2604.
65. See, e.g., Christian Legal Soc’y of the Univ. of Cal. v. Martinez, 561 U.S. 661, 689
(2010) (“Our decisions have declined to distinguish between status and conduct in this
context.”); Elane Photography v. Willock, LLC, 309 P.3d 53, 62 (N.M. 2013) (“We agree
that when a law prohibits discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation, that law
similarly protects conduct that is inextricably tied to sexual orientation . . . . In this case,
we see no basis for distinguishing between discrimination based on sexual orientation and
discrimination based on someone’s conduct of publicly committing to a person of the same
sex.”); State v. Arlene’s Flowers, Inc., 389 P.3d 543, 553 (Wash. 2017) (“Stutzman argues
that the [state public accommodations law] distinguishes between discrimination on the
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ground when it rejected the status/conduct distinction in
Obergefell. We know of no court that has taken the opposite
view.66
All nine justices in Masterpiece saw the link between same
sex wedding goods and services and the subordination of LGBTQ
citizens. The seven in the majority—joined implicitly on this point
by dissenting Justices Ginsburg and Sotomayor—agreed that
religious exemptions from public accommodations laws must be
narrowly cabined or else “a long list of persons who provide goods
and services for marriages and weddings might refuse to do so for
gay persons, thus resulting in a community-wide stigma
inconsistent with the history and dynamics of civil rights laws.”67
That many such refusals would come from sincere religious
believers would be a matter of regret, but it would not change the
social consequences.
Wedding vendors who turn their backs on same sex marriage
on religious grounds have no evil in their hearts, in the
overwhelming majority of cases, but nevertheless they hold
beliefs that coincide unhappily with the stratification that gays
and lesbians have experienced. We are back to Charles Black and
social structures. Vendors’ exclusion of same-sex spouses
amounts to discrimination against gays and lesbians because it
emerges from and contributes to their subordination. State and
local governments have discretion to legislate against that form of
refusal, insisting (as they often do) that it equates to
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation.
In contrast, consider William Jack’s cases, where bakers
refused to provide cakes that bore words condemning same sex
marriage. Business owners refused to provide that service because
they strongly supported marriage equality and they did not want
to write words that explicitly contradicted that belief. Assume that
William Jack was a member of a faith that opposed same sex
basis of ‘sexual orientation’—which the statute prohibits—and discrimination against
those who marry members of the same sex. But numerous courts—including our own—
have rejected this kind of status/conduct distinction in cases involving statutory and
constitutional claims of discrimination . . . . In accordance with this precedent, we reject
Stutzman’s proposed distinction between status and conduct fundamentally linked to that
status.”) (citations omitted).
66. Scholars have tried to distinguish between status and conduct in the context of
wedding vendors’ attempts to exclude same-sex couples, however. See Brief of Amici
Legal Scholars, supra note 60.
67. Masterpiece, 138 S. Ct. at 1727.
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marriage on scriptural grounds, as he actually appeared to be.68
When the state permitted bakers to refuse his requests, did it
thereby render his faith vulnerable to the deep and pervasive
patterns of “disrespect and subordinat[ion]” that we have called
structural injustice? The answer, it seems clear, is simply no.
Feelings around marriage equality run high, obviously, and it
is possible to imagine in extreme cases that a neighbor or a
customer or a friend will think less of a faith after learning that it
opposes same-sex marriage. Perhaps disagreements of that sort
could even lead to serious breaches in friendship or decisions to
patronize another merchant. Conflicts of this sort are unfortunate
and painful. But they are not the stuff of systematic and enduring
disrespect and subordination; they do not resonate with structural
injustice.
The bakers who rejected William Jack’s cakes did so because
of their messages, not because of his identity, commitments or
beliefs. A baker who objected to same-sex marriage could
similarly reject cakes that bore messages endorsing marriage
equality.69 The state has powerful reasons not to tell merchants
what words they must attach to their products.70
Given all this, it is startling to hear that “[e]veryone . . .
know[s] what is really going on” when Colorado requires Jack
Phillips to treat same sex wedding celebrants the same as all of his
other customers, but permits bakers of all sorts to decline to

68. See Holden, supra note 28 (describing William Jack as “Christian educator” who
was a founder of Worldview Academy, which was “dedicated to helping Christians think
and live in accord with a Biblical worldview”).
69. Again, that was almost exactly the holding of the Supreme Court of the United
Kingdom in Lee v. Ashers Baking Co., Ltd., [2018] UKSC 49. There, the court declined to
impose liability on a company that refused, on religious grounds, to create a cake bearing
the words “Support Gay Marriage.” The court reasoned that “It is deeply humiliating, and
an affront to human dignity, to deny someone a service because of that person’s race,
gender, disability, sexual orientation or any of the other protected personal characteristics.
But that is not what happened in this case and it does the project of equal treatment no
favours to seek to extend it beyond its proper scope.” Id. at para. 35.
70. Cf. Lexington Fayette Urban Cty. Human Rights Comm’n v. Hands On
Originals, Inc., No. 2015–CA–000745–MR, 2017 WL 2211381, at *6 (Ky. Ct. App. May 12,
2017) (considering a case where a Christian business, Hands on Originals, refused to
produce t-shirts celebrating a gay pride festival and holding that the public
accommodations law was not violated because “[n]othing of record demonstrates [Hands
on Originals] . . . refused any individual the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services,
facilities, privileges, advantages, and accommodations it offered to everyone else because
the individual in question had a specific sexual orientation or gender identity”) (emphasis
omitted).
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create messages that they find offensive.71 We are able to better
understand this sense of the world if we appreciate that it is
related to a different and deeper sense of injury. Religious
objectors to same sex marriage suffered a serious loss when the
Supreme Court held in Obergefell that same sex couples had a
constitutional right to marry.72 The highest judicial authority on
the meaning of the Constitution had ruled that what they
regarded as vivid guiding truths were inconsistent with the
demands of equal justice. The Supreme Court seemed to have left
behind their deep and special concerns about the world. Nowhere
was this more vibrantly represented than in the application of
state and local public accommodation laws to marriage service
providers. That dynamic made the Supreme Court’s willingness to
hear Masterpiece an occasion of great importance to religious
conservatives; it opened up an opportunity to constrain
Obergefell, and to establish a right for believers to disregard some
laws, despite Employment Division v. Smith. But, as we explained
in Part I, the Masterpiece Court reaffirmed both Obergefell and
the proposition that fervent religious commitment does not entitle
objectors to exemptions from antidiscrimination laws. This aspect
of Masterpiece undoubtedly disappointed religious dissenters, as
it left standing state laws that require the equal treatment of same
sex spouses, and imposed on them the personal cost of
compliance. But that cost did not undermine the importance of
ensuring equal citizenship status for all, nor did it call into
question the constitutional status of laws that work to that end.
CONCLUSION
It may well be the case that some wedding vendors who
oppose same sex marriage on religious grounds will feel ill-treated
when required to accept same sex couples as customers on equal
terms with others. America’s constitutional commitment to the
dismantlement of structural injustice has led civil rights law to
require commercial enterprises to comply with antidiscrimination
rules, even when those rules are inconsistent with the religious
beliefs or cultural commitments of some owners. Everyone should
acknowledge and respect the commitments and identifications of
religious citizens who object to marriage equality. We ourselves
71.
72.

Laycock & Berg, supra note 43.
Many nonreligious objectors to marriage equality suffered a similarly serious loss.
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affirm believers’ claim to equal respect unequivocally. But the
effort to limit marriage equality in Masterpiece has properly
failed. That effort cannot be revived in the form of an argument
that Charlie Craig and David Mullins must suffer discrimination
simply because William Jack could find no bakers willing to create
cakes bearing his messages. Any such suggestion runs headlong
into the reality principle.
Charles Black understood that there were feelings and values
on both sides of the segregation debate.73 He also appreciated the
view that there were constitutional interests on both sides
(because segregationists enjoyed freedom of association), which
he called the argument from “symmetry.”74 Finally, he saw that
finding social meanings can be difficult because “there is no
ritually sanctioned way in which the Court, as a Court, can
permissibly learn what is obvious to everybody else and to the
Justices as individuals.”75 We acknowledge those complexities as
well, as we must. They are genuine difficulties, but they should
not obscure our perception of reality any more than they obscured
his.
Ultimately, Charles Black rejected the false equivalence of
constitutional values that claimed to disable the declaration of
racial justice in Brown. The Masterpiece Court is being read by
some to gesture towards the proposition that a state can only
protect a couple from being refused a wedding cake because they
are both men if it also protects a person who wants to buy a cake
inscribed with words denouncing same sex marriage. That
equivalence is false as well, and it should be firmly rejected.

73. Black, supra note 51, at 100 (acknowledging the fear that the Fourteenth
Amendment would come to regulate “the genuinely private concerns of man”).
74. Black, supra note 5, at 428.
75. Id. at 427.

